The Problem of China's Legitimacy

For this week’s post, I’d like to bring up the idea of legitimacy that we discussed in previous discussion sections and lectures. As Professor King mentioned in class, there is the performance form of legitimacy which supposes that as long as a government is supposed to do what it’s supposed to do, it’ll be considered legitimate. At least in my point of view, that describes roughly the regime scenarios we’ve discussed in class. And China is just one of these regimes that has attempted this approach in the economic way.

For example, Meredith reiterates the fact that the Chinese people are hungry for political stability; the China of today “concerns [itself] with money rather than the prospect of voting…There is no push for democracy from either the Chinese citizenry or the government” (Meredith, 155). Buruma, in his article, also echoes this sentiment: “One party rule is justified, not by political dogma, but by economic efficiency and progress” (Buruma, 393). At the same time, he states that “an authoritarian one-party fits the Chinese tradition, and most Chinese prefer it to the potential disorder of hasty democratization” (392). Partly having to do with China’s turbulent late 19th-early 20th century history and its victimhood mentality and eagerness to prove itself, political legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people means that the government is able to provide, in some way, shape, or form, a standard of living acceptable to the Chinese people. That’s why, as Meredith notes, the CPP (Communist People’s Party) is increasingly concerned about and have begun measures to ameliorate the some 200+ protests that occur in China a day. After all, these protests only serve to show that to some, CPP legitimacy is decreasing. If the story of social and economic equality is being discarded by the government itself, the people will naturally want to question purpose and ultimately, the necessity of the ruling institution. While China, as Meredith notes, is booming economically and a portion of its population is flourishing, what the PRC has done is that, in pursuit of legitimacy and proving itself in the global community, has “disintegrated” from within. Indeed, even Buruma (and Meredith) notes that there is a potential for China to “explode” because it lacks substance in its rule. That is, while a thriving economy might justify PRC rule, it is only a small part of the overall equation. The PRC has thus far been able to maintain authoritarian one-party rule by legitimizing power (after having failed miserably to legitimize political power during the Cultural Revolution) in the form of economics, but as Meredith and Buruma point out, this may not be enough.

It might seem idealistic to call legitimacy of government as determined by the people nowadays but that seems to be the case for China. China, in a race to prove itself as a powerhouse through economy and using the Olympics as a forms to manifest a “new China” is doing so at the expense of values it has attempted to cement into posterity over the past 60 years. Meredith and Buruma both note that there is increasing dissent from within China whether it be manifested through the persecution of the Falun Gong to the provocations of a restless media and dissatisfied peasantry.

We’ve been warned of these types of societies time over time. While it might be extreme to compare China to Orwell’s 1984 (just because that really was a dystopia), the simple fact is that Chinese people who have accumulated wealth and a substantial means of existence have ignored the substance needed in society. True, money can make the pain go away; after all, China emerged from years of poverty and self-destruction with a renewed vigor and sense of self-pride from pursuing economic liberalization. But, I’d venture to say that it’s gone a little too far in terms of not being able to balance that economic liberalization with the values that echo of social and economic equality. Behind the economic “prosperity” are a lot of other problems that the PRC needs to fix; legitimacy by way of strong economy is not enough. Although I’m sure the CPP is cognizant of this, however as Buruma states, the CPP is too self-obsessed with itself to allow any political reforms “that would diminish the party’s grip on power” (393). The CPP’s modus operandi has often been to ignore the bad and embrace the good, so acute is its fear that “bad” reflected “weakness.” In that, it continues to hope the country can just move on and and leave any reminder of the darkness behind. But if that’s the mentality that the CPP keeps up in this age of globalization, then it just might be throwing away a blanket of darkness only to be tossed into another one.