Migdal's Insights

The first chapter of Migdal's Strong Societies and Weak States includes a number of important ideas that may be helpful in thinking of "development." He attacks the prevailing theories not merely for their internal deficiencies, but also their underlying philosophy. Lerner, Rostow, and Shils conceived of state development as both teleological and rationalistic. There was a final stage to reach, and movements towards this were progression while those away from it were devolution. Furthermore, the "telos" was to be achieved by the methods of modern social science. Each believed that his theory possessed the key to unlocking the problem of developing countries. "Social scientists were thought ablt to unlock the secrets of social engineering," writes Midgdal (10). He astutely traces the roots of their rationalist "philosophy of history" back to the Enlightenment philosophers of "progress" (12). The movement and development of nations was an "evolution" from "promordial" to modern (24). There was an "assumed inevitability" (25). In order to effect this magnificent transformation, a rational, central authority was needed. The state was seen as the agent of change and progress for these "backward" places.

Migdal throws a wrench into the works of these theories. These state-centric thinkers were all coming from the point of view of Western former imperial powers. Their expansion and international aggression inevitably led to a strong state. It was the state's "fantastic advantage over other political entities in mobilizing and organizing the resources for war" that propelled its rising predominance in earlier centuries (21). Here Migdal picks up on the following axiom of poitics: war centralizes power. The rise of the modern state was forged in international conflict. Other forms of association and local groups fell to the wayside with the advent of massive, mobilized armies. This experience, however, was not shared by all the countries in the world. Those with less power settled into "nooks and crannies," avoiding the colossal powers which collided above (23). They never created strong central states; they never participated in the vast international conflicts of the century. For these states a "melange" or "weblike" structure of numerous centers of authority persisted (28, 37). These are usually former colonies.

Remembering these two histories, it makes sense that the "melange" countries would resist the imposition of state-centric institutions and policies. Lerner, Rostow, and Shils "fail to account for powerful forces of resistance" (24). I believe that if one is to "improve" these nations in any way, it must be done with profound humility. A nation is a terribly complex entity to tamper with, and Migdal's work shows that the intricacies of each particular locale cannot be ignored. We should not expect development to proceed along well-known "western" tracks in non-western areas. Perhaps the greatest example of this error is the philosophy of nation-building which supported the Iraq War. Furthermore, before taking action let us step back and analyze our motives. Are they completely pure? If note, this does much to explain why the development efforts have been a history of "imposition" and not "inspiration."