Democratic Stability

Political scientists have largely abandoned a teleological conception of politics in which democracy is the ultimate end to political development. Thomas Carothers and others argue that we should no longer view non-democratic regimes as in transition to democracy. There are many examples of such regimes that seem to have achieved a stable political system without democracy. China is often used as an example of such a country. Over the last 30 years China has experienced dramatic economic growth, and except for the Tienanmen Square riots in 1989 and other smaller protests, its authoritarian government has remained largely stable. Using Singapore as a model, China has substituted economic opportunity for political opportunity and largely appeased its people by doing so. It has sacrificed legitimacy based on democracy for legitimacy based purely on performance. It seems true, then, that there are other stable political system besides Democracy.

But Robyn Meredith exposes a few key facts that undermine this notion. First, she writes that China's own leaders have acknowledged the need for economic growth of at least 8% a year in order to maintain in power. This implies an inherent lack of stability in the Chinese political system. Even very poor established democracies, India for instance, do not have to worry about their regime being overthrown if they do not provide this kind of performance. Instead, democracy provides an outlet for dissatisfaction at the government performance. If one government does not perform, then voters will oust them in favor of another.

Secondly, according to Meredith, there are a huge number of political protests in China, especially among the rural poor. These groups are dissatisfied at the uneven growth, the corruption of local officials and the increasing environmental degradation. Often they are violently repressed by the military. Given enough dissatisfaction, it seems possible that massive anti-government uprising on a scale the military cannot hope to fully control could result. Even if the government can hang on, any political system that must rely on coercion cannot be said to be stable.

Finally, the corruption of local politicians indicates systemic instability. In a pluralistic democracy, a free press can expose corruption and the people can punish officials shown to be corrupt by voting them out of office. China must rely on a top down approach in which the Communist Party punishes corruption in its own ranks, but this system has not proven terribly effective. Bad enough corruption could potentially threaten the stability of the Chinese autocratic state.

The fact is that non-democratic regimes, while often stable for long periods of time, are not as fundamentally stable as democratic regimes. Any system that must rely solely on Charismatic legitimacy, performance legitimacy or on violent coercion can not be said to a truly stable system. There are too many shocks that could push elements in that society, whether the people or other elites, to overthrow the government and establish something new. Only democratic forms of government, though certainly not all or even most of them, ever provide real stability in which popular dissatisfaction results in a simple change in leadership and not the overthrow of the system itself. It seems then that, given enough time, the need for stability will push all systems towards greater democratization.