Problems of Democratic Theory

The article by Fareed Zakharia is one that is particularly shocking to the American student. We are taught that in a democracy one need not fear the government, for “we are the government.” Our vote is our protection, and the “people are sovereign.” Zakharia sees this strongly in Mill’s thought, but this error is notably espoused even earlier in Rousseau’s Social Contract. What must be remembered is his ominous caveat: those who disagree will be “forced to be free.” The great father of modern democracy recognized one of its inherent problems, but for him it wasn’t an issue: the minority has to suck it up. This is why democracy, without any other modifiers, often leads to majoritarian tyranny. I am reminded of an article by Giovanni Sartori in Preface to Democratic Theory that highlights the difference between ancient Greek democracy and the “liberal constitutional” democracy which began in the US and UK. The former rested solely on majority rule, while the latter placed restrictions upon the majority’s power. As we know from The Federalist, the Greek democracies “vibrated between tyranny and anarchy.” This was what the Framers sought to prevent through “liberal constitutionalism.”

Along with Zakharia, I believe that too often a zeal for “equality” through arithmetic majoritarianism leads to a diminishment of “liberty” and governmental restraint. What are we really seeking for in our political lives? Is equality a means whereby we hope to maximize freedom, or has equality become an end in itself? Throughout history most of “equality’s” reputation has been garnered because of its instrumentality, but this may have been forgotten. At bottom, though, what we should really want is freedom to live our lives. This is why Zakharia astutely described constitutional liberalism as defining “government’s goals,” and not simply laying out “procedures.” Ends should trump means! Equality or suffrage by itself is nothing positive, and at its worst gets us what Burke described as “equality in servitude and boredom.” This is the warning of Tocqueville regarding “soft tyranny.” The sacrifice of freedom for “equality” can end in a system of governmental “paternalism,” where the state is forced to take care of almost all of its citizens daily needs. Freedom is sacrificed to gain the satisfaction of equality, and simultaneously the “burden” of freedom is lifted as government takes on the role of provider. This leads to the “centralization of authority, often by extra-constitutional means,” as Zakharia notes.

This is big-government modern “liberalism,” a philosophy of paternalism through redistribution in an effort to help the underdog. Recall FDR’s “New Deal” and LBJ’s “Great Society” programs. The “liberalism” that Zakharia is discussing is “classical liberalism.” It holds that the individual and civil society have certain rights against the state, and that government can only function in a limited sphere and in a prescribed way. Zakharia lists the following: “rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties.” It is ironic that the decline of freedom-centered thinking through an overemphasis on democratic equality was mirrored by its antithesis, a rise in paternalism, and yet both claim grounding in philosophies of the same name! The paternalistic state, however, is only one of the possibilities that unrestricted democracy creates. As Zakharia says, there are “many possible exits.” The take home message is this: universal suffrage alone is no true safeguard to anything. We need to ask what our ends are, and make sure that the means we employ are actually furthering them.