In Professor King’s lecture on decisions in institutions we came to the conclusion that the “majority will” cannot exist without the institutions that shape what we believe and how we express our beliefs. In this week’s readings and lectures, we examined the ways in which electoral institutions shape, limit, and determine the voter’s expression. While last week we determined that irrational outcomes could be reached, this week we dealt less with the rationality of an outcome, and more so with the values upheld by the different electoral systems. The differences in values and systems have practical consequences, as illustrated in all of the articles in this week’s reading. I would like to bring up some of these values and consequences that I found intriguing.
First, I found Reilly’s idea of centripetalism to be interesting. In the two party system of the US, this centripetal pull is generally not influential, except in times of crisis (though it doesn’t appear that way now). The presidential primary system in no way pulls to the middle. A candidate has to prove himself to all shades of the party in order to be their representative. In a multiparty PR system, centripitalism is a good way of viewing how compromise might be reached. But like Lijphart points out, we should differentiate between moderate PR and extreme PR. Moderate PR maintains a high threshold, while extreme PR is more inclusive of minority views. In a practical sense, one can envision that finding middle ground among 8 different perspectives might be difficult and time consuming. In regards to ease of negotiation vs. diversity of views represented, moderate PR would appear to be a good compromise between plurality (basic two way negotiation) and extreme PR (central goal becomes ambiguous due to multiple inputs).
The prospect of a PR election elicited a concern about the dynamics of the legislative body. I would like to see a comparative study done on the results of PR elections and the subsequent legislative dynamic. I think it’s possible that after a PR election a state would still have 1-2 parties as the dominant forces within politics. I am curious to see how many of the PR systems have ever had three (or more) almost equally powerful parties. If my belief is true, consider the situation of two major parties in a parliament, neither possessing a majority vote, and how this affects their relation to the minority parties represented. It is possible that the two parties would be inclined to compete over the swing vote of the minority party moreso than compromise and conciliate with the opposing major party. A resulting partisan law would be drawn up as more favorable to minorities, while avoiding the aims of the other major party. I think this is a realistic problem, and it puts the minority parties in a tough spot. Who do they side with? Do they continue the relationship? Can the minority party then have any initiatives if it is seen as merely a tiebreaker?
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In discussion yesterday, we briefly broached the topic of Benjaman Reilly's centripitalism. The Median Voter Theorem had particular relevance to this proposal in regard to campaign politics in majority electoral systems. MVT proposes that politicians, to ensure election, will target the moderate or centrist voter. Though Reilly suggested centripitalism's emergence in divided societies as a means for encouraging voting coalitions in preferential voting systems, I would argue for its general application to general elections in non-preferential systems. But I'd also argue that it surfaces for a reason contrary to that which Reilly proposes. As we acknowledged, (I believe Beth brought this up), in most major elections, independents are the ones whose votes must be won by the candidates of either established party. Party-line voting is the norm among most affiliated individuals. In the present election, the fight for the moderate voter has encouraged a general mellowing on rhetoric on the side of the Democrats and the Republicans. However, there has not been a mellowing of basic party positions. For the most part, the parties are toting their lines. In a system with few parties and non-proportional representation, politicians tend to temper extreme positions and their presentation in order to do just what Reilly argues centripitalism will discourage in PR systems: vote-shopping. The independents are a moderate bloc to be won, and it seems infrequent that true coalition-building results from the centripital effects of bipartisan politics. In conclusion, I disagree that centripitalism is absent or inactive in the US; however, it is manifested within parties for the end of obtaining moderate votes - not to moderate positions of both parties to form a coalition.
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